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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal requires us to decide a narrow issue: under 
what circumstances, if any, is the FDIC required to pay the cost 
of lease-mandated structural repairs and modifications to a 
building when it acts as a receiver for a failed lessee-thrift 
and disaffirms its lease under FIRREA?  To decide this issue, we 
must construe 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4), the provision of FIRREA 
that sets forth the FDIC's obligations when it disaffirms leases. 
Because we believe that the FDIC's liability for "unpaid rent" 
under FIRREA includes the costs of the structural repairs 
mandated by the lease, if any, we will reverse the district 
court's order rejecting the claim for these repairs.  We also 
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will reverse the district court's order rejecting the lessor's 
claim for the costs of making modifications to the building to 
comply with the ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act), because 
the district court incorrectly applied the "readily achievable" 
standard to determine whether the liabilities had accrued.  We 
will remand the case to the district court to determine whether 
the obligation of repairing the building and complying with the 
ADA had matured by the date the thrift went into receivership. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Plaintiff, First Bank National Association, Trustee, 
("First Bank"), brought this action for breach of contract 
against the defendant, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
("FDIC") pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1811 et seq., as amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").  First Bank 
alleged that the FDIC, as receiver for Meritor Savings Bank 
("Meritor"), formerly known as the Philadelphia Savings Fund 
Society, was liable for sums due under a sublease of the historic 
PSFS building Meritor occupied at 12 South 12th Street, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.0 
 Meritor, the owner of the PSFS building, entered into a 
complex series of lease and sublease agreements with First Bank 
and other entities during the 1980s.  First Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 
                     
0The building, designed by George Howe and William Lescaze and 
constructed in 1933, is considered one of the first examples in 
the United States of the International Style of architecture. See 
Vincent Scully, American Architecture and Urbanism 154 (1988). 
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FDIC, 885 F. Supp. 117, 118 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  As a result, First 
Bank became Meritor's landlord under a sublease for the space 
Meritor occupied in the building, with Meritor apparently 
retaining only nominal title to the building.  App. 63. Meritor's 
sublease ran until December 31, 2006, but included three options 
to renew for ten-year terms until December 31, 2036.  First Bank, 
885 F. Supp. at 119. 
 Paragraph 4(a) of the sublease between First Bank and 
Meritor required Meritor initially to "pay to [First Bank] in 
lawful money of the United States as fixed rent for the Premises" 
$1,806,000 per quarter.   App. 83, 137.  While the sublease 
provided for subsequent changes in the rent, the $1,806,000 
figure controlled when the FDIC became the receiver.  Paragraph 
6(a)(i) committed Meritor to pay "all taxes, assessments, 
governmental or quasi-governmental levies, fees, water and sewer 
rents and charges, and all other governmental charges general and 
special, ordinary and extraordinary, foreseen and unforeseen" 
imposed during the term of the sublease.  App. 87. 
 Pursuant to paragraph 6(b) of the sublease, Meritor 
also was obligated to: 
comply with and cause the Premises to comply 
with (i) all laws, ordinances and 
regulations, and other governmental rules, 
orders and determinations now or hereafter 
enacted, made or issued, whether or not 




 The sublease expansively required that Meritor: 
maintain all parts of the Premises in good 
repair and condition, except for ordinary 
5 
wear and tear and except as expressly 
provided in paragraph 11(b),0 and . . . take 
all action and . . . make all structural and 
non-structural, foreseen and unforeseen and 
ordinary and extraordinary changes and 
repairs which may be required to keep all 
parts of the Premises in good repair and 
condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted. 
Lessor shall not be required to maintain, 
repair or rebuild all or any part of the 
premises. 
 
App. 92.  Overall, it is clear that the sublease put the risks 
and burdens of maintaining the building on Meritor. 
 The Secretary of Banking of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania declared Meritor to be in unsafe and unsound 
condition on December 11, 1992, and, pursuant to FIRREA, the FDIC 
was appointed its receiver on the same day.  The FDIC disaffirmed 
the sublease for the PSFS building pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 
§1821(e)(1), on March 31, 1993, and the disaffirmance was 
effective that day.0  
                     
0The provisions of paragraph 11(b) are not applicable here. 
012 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) provides: 
 
(e) Provisions relating to contracts entered into 
before appointment of conservator or receiver 
 
(1) Authority to repudiate contracts 
 
 In addition to any other rights a conservator or 
receiver may have, the conservator or receiver for 
any insured depository institution may disaffirm 
or repudiate any contract or lease- 
 
(A) to which such institution is a party; 
 
(B) the performance of which the conservator 
or receiver, in the conservator's or 




 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4)(B), upon the 
disaffirmance First Bank, as lessor, was entitled to "any unpaid 
rent, subject to all appropriate offsets and defenses, due as of 
the date of the appointment. . . ."  In addition, First Bank was 
"entitled to contractual rent" from the FDIC "accruing before . . 
. the disaffirmance [of the lease] . . . becomes effective." 
Following the disaffirmance, First Bank filed an administrative 
claim with the FDIC, and, after its rejection, filed this timely 
action on April 7, 1994, as permitted by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6). 
 At the trial, First Bank claimed the FDIC was liable 
under section 1821(e)(4)(B) for: 
(1) $1,404,666.67 in unpaid 'fixed quarterly rent' for 
the period October 1, 1992 through December 11, 1992; 
 
(2) $224,119.68 in property taxes for the period 
January 1, 1993 through March 31, 1993; 
 
(3) $285,000 for modification of the building to comply 
with the Americans with Disabilities Act ('ADA'); 
 
(4) $980,000 for rehabilitation of the north facade of 
the PSFS building; 
 
(5) $50,000 for repair of the plumbing; 
 
(6) $12,000 for repair of the electrical systems; 
 
(7) $355,000 for renovation and repair of the heating, 
ventilating and air conditioning ('HVAC') system; and 
 
(8) prejudgment interest on all of the above amounts. 
 
                                                                  
(C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which 
the conservator or receiver determines, in 
the conservator's or receiver's discretion, 
will promote the orderly administration of 
the institution's affairs. 
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First Bank, 885 F. Supp. at 119-20.  In its opinion and judgment 
of April 20, 1995, the district court found that the above claims 
were valid except for the expenses for the modifications of the 
building to comply with the ADA, the cost of the structural 
repairs of the north facade of the building, and prejudgment 
interest other than that due on the rent.  First Bank appeals 
from the denial of the costs of structural repairs to the north 
facade of the building and the costs of modifying the building to 
comply with the ADA.  The district court had jurisdiction under 
12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2) and 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6), and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
  To decide whether the district court correctly 
rejected First Bank's claims for the cost of structural repairs 
and modifications required by the lease, we must construe 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4), the provision of FIRREA that specifies the 
FDIC's obligations when it disaffirms leases.   
 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4) reads in whole: 
(4) Leases under which the institution is the 
lessee 
 
(A) In general 
 
If the conservator or receiver 
disaffirms or repudiates a lease under 
which the insured depository institution 
was the lessee, the conservator or 
receiver shall not be liable for any 
damages (other than damages determined 
pursuant to subparagraph (B)) for the 
disaffirmance or repudiation of such 
lease. 
 (B) Payments of rent 
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Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the 
lessor under a lease to which such 
subparagraph applies shall- 
 
 (i) be entitled to the 
contractual rent accruing before 
the later of the date- 
(I) the notice of 
disaffirmance or repudiation 
is mailed; 
(II) the disaffirmance or 
repudiation becomes effective,  
unless the lessor is in default or 
breach of the terms of the lease; 
 
 (ii) have no claim for damages 
under any acceleration clause or 
other penalty provision in the 
lease; and 
 
 (iii) have a claim for any 
unpaid rent, subject to all 
appropriate offsets and defenses, 
due as of the date of the 
appointment which shall be paid in 
accordance with this subsection and 
subsection (i) of this section.0 
                     
0
 This provision, like much of FIRREA, was modeled after 
the Bankruptcy Code, in this instance, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6), the 
provision dealing with a trustee's obligations if it terminates a 
lease. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 502(b) provides in relevant part: 
 
(b)  Except as provided in subsections 
(e)(2), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of this 
section, if such objection to a claim is 
made, the court after notice and a hearing, 
shall determine the amount of such claim in 
lawful currency of the United States as of 
the date of the filing of the petition, and 
shall allow such claim in such amount, except 
to the extent that- 
. . . . 
(6) if such claim is the claim of a lessor 
for damages resulting from the termination of 
a lease of real property, such claim exceeds- 
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 First Bank argues that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4) limits 
claims only to the extent of "any damages . . . for the 
disaffirmance or repudiation of such lease."  It thus does not 
read the words "other than damages determined pursuant to 
subparagraph (B)" as relating to any obligation other than those 
flowing from the disaffirmance.  Since the damages for the costs 
to repair the facade and to comply with the ADA did not result 
from the disaffirmance, First Bank argues that subsection (e)(4) 
does not limit its claims.  See Pioneer Bank and Trust Co. v. 
RTC, 793 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 While we acknowledge that First Bank's reading of 
section 1821(e)(4) is not unreasonable, we nevertheless disagree 
with it.  Subsection (4)(B)(iii) states that when the receiver 
disaffirms a lease, the lessor shall "have a claim for any unpaid 
rent . . . due as of the date of the appointment."  Such unpaid 
rent is not a claim that stems from the disaffirmance or 
repudiation of the lease.  Consequently, if subsection (4)(A) 
                                                                  
 (A) the rent reserved by such lease, 
without acceleration, for the greater of one 
year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three 
years, of the remaining term of such lease, 
following the earlier of- 
 
(i) the date of the filing of the 
petition; and 
(ii) the date on which such lessor 
repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, 
the leased property; plus 
 
 (B) any unpaid rent due under such 
lease, without acceleration, on the earlier 




excluded only claims arising from the disaffirmance of the lease, 
subsection (4)(B)(iii) would be superfluous, as the lessor would 
have a claim for unpaid rent as of the date of the appointment of 
the receiver without regard for the disaffirmance.    
 It is a black letter rule of statutory interpretation 
that, if possible, a court should construe a statute to avoid 
rendering any element of it superfluous.  See United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1060 (1994).  Consequently, we construe 
subsection (4)(B) to govern the receiver's overall liability for 
damages when it repudiates a lease.  Cf. RTC v. Ford Motor Credit 
Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument 
that section 1821(e)(4) serves only to limit the RTC's liability 
for interests that accrue wholly after the receivership and 
permits recovery against property in which the lessor has a 
perfected security interest); In re McSheridan 184 B.R. 91, 100-
02 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995) (analogous portion of bankruptcy code 
encompasses all claims for breach of lease; specifically 
rejecting argument that appellant's claims for prepetition breach 
of covenants not "termination" damages and therefore not governed 
by provision).  By rejecting First Bank's narrow reading of 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4), we are consistent with the approach of the 
district court. 
 The district court, however, construed subsection 
(e)(4) to limit claims to "contractual rent," under section 
1821(e)(4)(B)(i).  It reasoned that "contractual rent" excluded 
claims for capital improvements because "such improvements by 
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their nature generally have a value to the lessor far beyond the 
value to the lessee."  885 F. Supp. at 120.  This construction 
makes a distinction between obligations that benefit a lessor 
over the long term and more conventional contractual obligations. 
See Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916, 920 (2d Cir. 
1944) (observing that "landlord not in the same position as other 
general creditors" because "he has been compensated up until the 
date of the bankruptcy petition [and] he regains his original 
assets upon bankruptcy"). 
 While as a policy matter the district court's 
distinction was reasonable, we reject its conclusion that First 
Bank's recovery is limited to "contractual rent" because we 
believe that the language of FIRREA simply will not accommodate 
the court's reading.  Section 1821(e)(4)(B) states in relevant 
part: 
Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the lessor 
under a lease to which such subparagraph 
applies shall- 
 
(i) be entitled to the contractual rent 
accruing before the later of the date- 
 
 (I) the notice of disaffirmance or 
repudiation is mailed; or 
 (II) the disaffirmance or 
repudiation becomes effective, 
. . . . 
(iii) have a claim for any unpaid rent, 
subject to all appropriate offsets and 
defenses, due as of the date of the 
appointment which shall be paid in 
accordance with this subsection and 
subsection (i) of this section. 
 
Id.  Thus, section 1821(e)(4)(B) provides that a claimant has the 
right to "unpaid rent" due at the date of appointment of the 
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receiver, and "contractual rent" accruing before the latter of 
the date that the notice of disaffirmance or repudiation is 
mailed or the date it becomes effective.0   
 "Rent," paid or unpaid, clearly encompasses contractual 
rent.  Yet "contractual rent" must include a different category 
of claims than "rent" generally.  If it did not, there would have 
been no reason for Congress to distinguish between "unpaid" and 
"contractual" rent in section 1821(e)(4)(B) or, at least, 
Congress would have required the FDIC to pay "unpaid contractual 
rent" rather then "unpaid rent" due as of the date of the 
appointment of the receiver.  Furthermore, it was logical for 
Congress to limit liability under the lease once a receiver was 
appointed.  We therefore construe section 1821(e)(4)(B) to 
distinguish between claims that accrue by the date of the 
receivership and claims that accrue between the date of 
receivership and the disaffirmance of the lease.  See In re 
Vause, 886 F.2d 794, 801 (6th Cir. 1989) (construing Bankruptcy 
Act to "provide the lessor with his actual damages for past rent, 
but placing a limit on his damages for speculative future rent 
payments in long-term leases"). 
 We therefore must decide if "unpaid rent" encompasses 
claims for obligations other than the quarterly monetary rent 
imposed on Meritor by December 11, 1992, the date that the FDIC 
was appointed its receiver.  We then must decide whether any 
                     
0This shadows the scheme limiting claims in the Bankruptcy Code 




claims that accrued between the date of receivership and the date 
that the FDIC disaffirmed the lease, March 31, 1993, constitute 
"contractual rent." 
 Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines rent as 
"consideration paid for use or occupation of property." Meritor's 
obligation to maintain the premises in good repair was an element 
of the consideration it paid for use of the property. Presumably, 
in lieu of a higher quarterly rent payment, the sublease 
obligated it to: 
maintain all parts of the Premises in good 
repair and condition except for ordinary wear 
and tear and  . . .[to] take all action and . 
. . make all structural and non-structural, 
foreseen and unforeseen and ordinary and 
extraordinary changes and repairs which may 
be required to keep all parts of the Premises 
in good repair and condition . . . . 
 
App. 92.  Furthermore, the sublease required Meritor to cause the 
premises to comply with all applicable governmental laws, 
ordinances, regulations and rules, even if adopted after the 
execution of the sublease.  Consequently, Meritor had an 
obligation to keep the premises in good condition and repair, and 
an obligation to ensure that the premises were maintained 
lawfully, even if satisfaction of these duties required it to 
make substantial renovations to the property.  We find that these 
obligations constitute "unpaid rent" for the purposes of 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4)(B)'s specification of the receiver's       
liability.0     
                     
0We do not decide whether an obligation under a lease provision 
ever could be so extreme as not to constitute "unpaid rent" under 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(b)(4)(B)(iii).  The obligations involved here 
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 We construe "contractual rent" more narrowly than 
"unpaid rent," however, to effect the purpose of the statute in 
giving the receiver an opportunity to survey the thrift's 
situation without being immediately required to decide whether to 
assume large obligations.  Here we find support in bankruptcy 
jurisprudence.  In 1185 Avenue of the Americas Assocs. v. RTC, 22 
F.3d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1994), the court noted that "chapter 3 of 
the Bankruptcy Code provides a helpful analogy" to the authority 
to repudiate contracts under FIRREA.  We nevertheless note that 
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are not identical to those of 
FIRREA and that "equitable principles developed in the 
reorganization context cannot simply be grafted onto the national 
banking statutes."  Corbin v. Federal Reserve Bank, 629 F.2d 233, 
236 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 1492 
(1981).   
 In this case, however, the analogy is apt; FIRREA and 
the Bankruptcy Code both seek to balance the legitimate claims of 
the lessor with those of the debtor and other claimants.  The 
interests of the lessor were explained well in Oldden v. Tonto 
Realty Corp., 143 F.2d at 920, where the court explained the 
history of the bankruptcy provision which limited a landlord's 
claims for future rent: 
But allowance in full of such claims did not 
seem the appropriate answer, since other 
general creditors would suffer 
proportionately, and the claims themselves 
would often be disproportionate in amount to 
any actual damage suffered, particularly in 
                                                                  
are not so stringent, particularly when compared to the quarterly 
rent of $1,806,000. 
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the event of a subsequent rise in rental 
values.  In truth, the landlord is not in the 
same position as other general creditors, and 
there is no very compelling reason why he 
should be treated on a par with them.  For, 
after all, he has been compensated up until 
the date of the bankruptcy petition, he 
regains his original assets upon bankruptcy, 
and the unexpired term in no way really 
benefits the assets of the bankrupt's estate. 
 
Id. at 919-20 (footnote omitted).  We find reliance on Oldden 
particularly appropriate as the legislative history of the 
present Bankruptcy Code shows that Congress approved that case. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 353-54 (1977), Pub. 
L. No. 598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 6309-10.   
 In construing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), the section of the 
Bankruptcy Code which limits lessor's post-bankruptcy claims, the 
bankruptcy courts generally have defined rent to be an obligation 
which is at least "fixed, regular, periodic."  In re Conston 
Corp., 130 B.R. 449, 455 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that 
claims constitute "rent" only if "the lease expressly so provides 
and the charges in question are properly classifiable as rent 
because they are regular, fixed, periodic charges . . ."); In re 
Gantos, Inc., 181 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995) 
(rejecting claim of construction allowance as "rent" because 
cases hold that payment must be "regular, fixed and periodically 
payable in the same manner as pure rent"); In re McSheridan, 184 
B.R. at 100 ("[C]harge must be properly classifiable as rent 
because it is a fixed, regular, or periodic charge."); In re 
Farley, Inc., 146 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) ("[Rent] 
includes any payments that relate directly to or increase the 
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value or worth of the property, and are fixed, regular 
payments."). 
 We find this formulation a useful and appropriate 
requirement to give meaning to Congress's restriction of a 
lessor's recovery for post-receivership claims to "contractual 
rent."  We conclude, therefore, that "contractual rent" refers 
only to those sums that are fixed, regular, periodic charges.0   
 In this case, the costs of structural repairs to the 
facade were not fixed, regular, and periodic.  Consequently, the 
FDIC is not subject to any liability for the cost of repairs that 
accrued after the institution of the receivership because those 
costs were not contractual rent.  The district court, however, 
found that "Meritor was required under its lease with First Bank 
                     
0We note that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit 
faced a problem of construing the analogous Bankruptcy Code 
provision, "rent reserved by such lease," in a similar fact 
situation of a long-term lease that placed the costs of 
maintaining the building on the lessee/debtor in In re 
McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91.  In that situation the court held that 
the following three-part test must be met for a claim to 
constitute "rent reserved"; 
 
(1) The charge must: (a) be designated as 
'rent' or 'additional rent' in the lease; or 
(b) be provided as the tenant's/lessee's 
obligation in the lease; 
 
(2) The charge must be related to the value 
of the property or the lease thereon; and 
 
(3) The charge must be properly classifiable 
as rent because it is a fixed, regular or 
periodic charge. 
 
We reserve the question as to whether for a charge to be 
"contractual rent" it must meet requirements other than being 
"fixed, regular, periodic" because we have no need to consider 
that point in this case. 
17 
to [install flashing under the windows and insert vertical joints 
in the facade to allow for brick movement]" at a cost of 
$980,000.  885 F. Supp. at 121.  This finding seemingly would 
make the FDIC liable for the structural repairs to the north 
facade under its obligation for unpaid rent.    
 The district court, however, made this finding in 
determining the contractual rent due to First Bank rather than 
determining the unpaid rent due.  As a result, it made its 
calculations as of the date the FDIC disaffirmed the lease, March 
31, 1993, rather than the date Meritor went into receivership, 
December 11, 1992.  Consequently, we must remand for the district 
court to find what amount, if any, of "unpaid rent" obligations 
had accrued by the date of the receivership, December 11, 1992. 
 In addition, we note that the FDIC argues that 
renovations less extensive than the full $980,000 reconstruction 
of the facade would have satisfied Meritor's obligations under 
the sublease.  Since the district court's finding that the full 
reconstruction was required by the sublease was made in the 
context of denying the claim altogether, the court should 
consider whether lesser expenditures would have fulfilled 
Meritor's obligations.  We will require this reconsideration 
because the court did not address this possibility in its 
opinion. 
 First Bank also argues that the district court erred 
when it rejected First Bank's claim for compensation to make 
modifications of the building's bathrooms and elevators to comply 
18 
with the Americans with Disabilities Act pursuant to paragraph 
6(b) of the sublease, which required Meritor to: 
comply with and cause the Premises to comply 
with (i) all laws, ordinances and 
regulations, and other governmental rules, 
orders and determinations now or hereafter 




 This obligation, like the obligation to make structural 
repairs to the north facade, is clearly part of the consideration 
that First Bank received for the lease and consequently qualifies 
as rent for the purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4)(B)(iii).  But 
since this obligation is not "regular, fixed and periodic," it, 
too, does not qualify as "contractual rent" under subsection 
(e)(4)(B)(i).  Therefore, for First Bank to recover for the costs 
of the modifications, Meritor's obligation to make the 
modifications must have accrued by December 11, 1992, the date 
the receivership was instituted. 
 The section of the ADA implicated here provides that: 
No individual shall be discriminated against 
on the basis of disability in the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases 
(or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).  Subsection (b)(2)(A) of section 12182 
describes actions and inactions that constitute discrimination 
under the statute and it states: 





For purposes of subsection (a) of this 
section, discrimination includes- 
. . . 
(iv) a failure to remove architectural 
barriers, and communication barriers 
that are structural in nature, in 
existing facilities . . . where such 
removal is readily achievable.0 
                     
0
"Readily achievable" is a term of art.  It is defined by 42 
U.S.C. § 12181(9) which states: 
 
The term 'readily achievable' means easily 
accomplishable and able to be carried out 
without much difficulty or expense.  In 
determining whether an action is readily 
achievable, factors to be considered include- 
 
(A) the nature and cost of the action 
needed under this chapter; 
 
(B) the overall financial resources of 
the facility or facilities involved in 
the action; the number of persons 
employed at such facility; the effect on 
expenses and resources, or the impact 
otherwise of such action upon the 
operation of the facility; 
 
(C) the overall financial resources of 
the covered entity; the overall size of 
the business of a covered entity with 
respect to the number of its employees; 
the number, type and location of its 
facilities; and 
 
(D) the type of operation or operations 
of the covered entity, including the 
composition, structure, and functions of 
the workforce of such entity; the 
geographic separateness, administrative 
or fiscal relationship of the facility 




The district court found that: 
While the ADA requires removal of 
architectural and communication barriers in 
existing public accommodations such as the 
PSFS building where such removal is 'readily 
achievable,' it does not require this process 
to be completed by any particular date. . . . 
Although one might well be able to argue that 
at some point a delay would constitute non-
compliance with the ADA and consequently a 
violation of the sublease, that point had not 
been reached by March 31, 1993. 
 
885 F. Supp. at 122.  The district court thus seemed to find that 
in order to constitute non-compliance under the ADA, a particular 
unmade modification: (1) must be "readily achievable" and (2) 
that an unspecified period, essentially a grace period, must have 
elapsed after the ADA's effective date even though the 
modifications were "readily achievable" earlier.  
 To the extent that the court's holding suggests that a 
grace period exists, we disagree because we find no provision for 
a grace period in the ADA.  We want to make clear, however, that 
in rejecting the "grace period" construction, we are not implying 
that the passage of time is irrelevant in determining liability 
under the ADA.  We are simply rejecting the district court's 
suggestion that liability depends on a temporal element that is 
independent of the "readily achievable" standard. 
 In considering what is "readily achievable" with 
respect to removal of architectural barriers, we first observe 
that the "readily achievable" standard necessarily includes a 
temporal element.  The ADA defines "readily achievable" as 
"easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much 
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difficulty or expense."  Yet what is easy to accomplish in one 
year may not be easily accomplishable in one day so a 
determination of what is "readily achievable" depends upon the 
passage of time.  Furthermore, the ADA does not indicate 
expressly whether the temporal element in "readily achievable" 
should be measured from the date of the ADA's enactment, July 26, 
1990, or the general effective date for the public accommodations 
title, January 26, 1992.  We observe, however, that cognizant of 
the burdens of the ADA's requirements, Congress granted small 
businesses more time than larger organizations before they could 
be liable for violations of the ADA.0  Thus, it might be 
                     
0Section 310 of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 353, provided that: 
 
(a) General rule - Except as provided in 
subsections (b) and (c), this title [enacting 
this subchapter] shall become effective 18 
months after the date of the enactment of 
this Act [July 26, 1990]. 
 
(b) Civil actions. - Except for any civil 
action brought for a violation of section 303 
[section 12183 of this title, governing 
requirements for new construction], no civil 
action shall be brought for any act or 
omission described in section 302 [section 
12182 of this title] which occurs- 
 
(1) during the first 6 months after the 
effective date, against businesses that 
employ 25 or fewer employees and have 
gross receipts of $1,000,000 or less; 
and 
 
(2) during the first year after the 
effective date, against businesses that 
employ 10 or fewer employees and have 
gross receipts of $500,000. 
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reasonable to conclude that the temporal element in a 
determination of whether the removal of a barrier is "readily 
achievable" should be measured from the ADA's enactment. 
 Indeed, it could be held as a matter of statutory 
construction that the ADA required that "readily achievable" 
modifications to existing facilities be made by its effective 
date so that the period between the enactment and the effective 
date fixed the temporal element of the "readily achievable" 
provision.  See Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes 
Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574, 584 (S.D. Cal. 1993) ("ADA provided 
an 18 month notice period in which businesses could comply with 
the Act's requirements . . . . [and] [s]mall businesses were 
given an even lengthier notice period.").  See also Karen E. 
Field, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act "Readily 
Achievable" Requirement For Barrier Removal:  A Proposal For The 
Allocation of Responsibility Between Landlord And Tenant, 15 
Cardozo L. Rev. 569, 570 (1993).  Of course, the district court 
in effect rejected this construction of the ADA by holding that, 
at least in this case, the ADA did not require "readily 
achievable" modifications to be made by March 31, 1993.  Yet, 
if the determination of whether a modification is "readily 
achievable" includes a temporal element measured from the date of 
the ADA's enactment, and concluding on its effective date, then 
the public accommodations section of the ADA was in a practical 
sense effective upon its enactment, rather than its stated 
effective date, because it required entities to comply with its 
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requirements no later than at the expiration of the 18-month 
period between its enactment and its effective date. 
 At this time we will not decide the point from which 
compliance with the "readily achievable" standard should be 
measured.  As we have indicated we have concluded that, 
regardless of that point, the district court did not apply the 
proper criteria to determine whether Meritor was in compliance 
with the ADA at the time of the initiation of its receivership. 
Thus, we will remand the case to it for further proceedings.   
 On the remand, the court first should determine whether 
the ADA should be construed to require that modifications, if 
"readily achievable," must be made by the effective date of the 
public accommodations title of the ADA to the facility involved.0  
If it so concludes then First Bank will be able to recover for 
the reasonable costs of the modifications to existing facilities 
in this case if they were "readily achievable" because the 
effective date of the ADA was prior to December 11, 1992.  If the 
court concludes as a matter of statutory construction that the 
ADA did not require otherwise "readily achievable" modifications 
to be made by its effective date, it should determine: (1) 
whether the temporal elements of "readily achievable" should be 
                     
0In its brief, First Bank indicates that even "assuming that the 
PSFS Building was a 'commercial facility' and not a place of 
public accommodation, the latest effective date for the ADA would 
be July 26, 1992, about nine months before the FDIC's 
disaffirmance of the Lease."  Br. at 22 n.3.  The FDIC seems to 
argue that if the building is a commercial facility, the ADA may 
not apply to it as it is not newly constructed.  Br. at 23 n.10. 
These points may be raised on remand. 
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measured from the ADA's enactment or its effective date, and; (2) 
whether the modifications in this case were "readily achievable" 
as a matter of fact by December 11, 1992.  To the extent, if any, 
that the modifications should have been made by that date, First 
Bank will be able to recover their reasonable cost. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 In view of our conclusions, we will reverse the April 
20, 1995 judgment of the district court both as to the denial of 
First Bank's claim for the cost of structural repairs to the 
north facade of the building and as to the district court's 
denial of First Bank's claim for ADA-mandated renovations.  We 
will remand the matter to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion with respect to the 
claim for structural repairs to the north facade and the ADA-
mandated renovations. 
